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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993.

I. PROGRESS TO DATE

A. Political aspects

2. The political mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) is derived from the relevant Security Council resolutions and implemented through the framework of the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993. This entails a delicately balanced, two-track approach: reconciliation among the national factions and promoting district and regional councils at the grass roots. Ideally, these tracks are complementary and mutually reinforcing in achieving national reconciliation and the foundation for representative governance.

1. National reconciliation

3. Progress in political reconciliation and reconstruction is central to the success of development efforts and the securing of international assistance to Somalia. This message has been repeatedly conveyed by the international community to the Somali political leadership. Two primary obstacles continue to impede progress on the political level: (a) deep divisions between the two main factional alliances, the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance (SNA); and (b) the continued rejection by SNA of all political initiatives undertaken by UNOSOM II.

4. A recent attempt to catalyse Somali national reconciliation was made at a political meeting following the Fourth Humanitarian Conference convened by the United Nations at Addis Ababa. From 2 to 11 December 1993, at the invitation of the Ethiopian Government and with the support of UNOSOM II, representatives of the two major alliances, the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance, met to discuss outstanding matters and disputes between them. Despite warnings from the international community that failure to achieve progress on the political front could drive away needed foreign assistance, the factional representatives failed to agree on a structure for face-to-face talks between the faction chairmen, and the initiatives unfortunately were not successful.

5. In fact, lacking a precise agenda, the informal political meeting bogged down almost immediately after it was convened over the issue of whether or not the United Nations should play a role in the national reconciliation process. Related to this issue was the relationship between the role of the United Nations and that of the President of Ethiopia as mandated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in this regard. Whereas SNA insisted that the United Nations had no role to play in political reconciliation, preferring this to be done by regional Powers, the Group of 12 held the view that UNOSOM II should

remain in Somalia and that the United Nations must play a key role in the Somali political process.

6. Other contributing factors to the unsuccessful outcome of the political meeting included the sharp differences of opinion between the Group of 12 and SNA over the status of the district and regional councils that had been established. Whereas the Group of 12 fully supported the legitimacy of these councils, SNA called for a fundamental review of their status and mandate. Another factor was the difference between them as to whether or not the Addis Ababa agreement should be amended. Objecting to SNA's suggestion that the Addis Ababa agreement might be revised, the Group of 12 stated that the agreement should not be altered. Even regarding an appropriate forum for national reconciliation, there was a difference of opinion. Prior to the convening of the Humanitarian Conference, SNA proposed to convene a meeting of Somalis at Mogadishu for national reconciliation during the first part of January 1994. However, this was not accepted by the Group of 12. The SNA faction has also complained that the United Nations was instigating the Group of 12 into taking actions to exclude it from the Somali national reconciliation process. Owing to clearly differing perspectives on crucial and important issues, no real discussion of these issues could take place at Addis Ababa.

7. Since returning from Addis Ababa to Somalia, the Group of 12 has organized meetings at Mogadishu as well as in various regions and issued statements expressing its views as to the next steps to be taken. Following its meeting at Mogadishu from 13 to 18 December 1993, the Group of 12 issued a resolution and an interim plan of action which, inter alia, called for the establishment of a permanent contact group for dialogue with SNA to speed up the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement. As part of the internal efforts to achieve political reconciliation, the Imam of Hirab, who covers both the Abgaal and Haber Gedir sub-clans, has been holding consultations with the two sub-clans in order to mediate for peace in Mogadishu. Parallel to this effort are other initiatives being undertaken mainly at the regional level to achieve a general reconciliation: Garowe (in the north-east), Bula-Haji (Lower Juba), Bardhera (Gedo) and Mogadishu with the Hawadle and Murusade Elders. All are requesting UNOSOM's logistical and financial support. The question of the participation and involvement of SNA remains the central point of all these initiatives.

8. A key task of UNOSOM II in the coming weeks and months will thus be to try to assist in efforts to unblock the national reconciliation process among the Somali factions. All means at UNOSOM II's disposal will be committed towards providing Somali leadership with an ample "window of opportunity" to meet and resolve their differences. Simultaneously, UNOSOM II will continue to convey the message to Somali factional leaders that the international community is not prepared to wait indefinitely for an improved security environment in which to work on behalf of the Somali people.

2. District councils

9. In the past two months, considerable progress has been made in the establishment of district councils throughout the country. Fourteen additional

councils have been certified during this period, bringing the total to 53 out of 81 districts (excluding the north-west). 1/ In accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the district councils shall be responsible for managing the affairs of the district, including public safety, health, education and reconstruction. Many of the district councils, however, lack the resources to become fully operational.

10. Strong objections were voiced by SNA in regard to efforts by UNOSOM II to set up the district and regional councils. In December, I therefore requested Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah to review the methodology and procedures utilized to determine the establishment of district and regional councils. From his report to me after his conversations with a number of Somalis and actual visits in December to some of the district councils, I am satisfied that at every stage, those involved in UNOSOM ensured that the Somali people themselves were in agreement with the methods and procedures used. In actual fact, each district council was certified by the elders and only witnessed by a United Nations official. Thus it could not be argued that the district and regional councils are being imposed on the people of Somalia. In addition, the Group of 12 is fully satisfied with the methodology and procedures and has been urging that UNOSOM II complete the establishment of the district and regional councils.

11. One of the primary obstacles to the effective establishment of district councils in Somalia has been the opposition of SNA, which has refused to participate in the process and which has in some instances attempted to block the formation of councils through intimidation or the creation of shadow SNA district councils. In the greater Mogadishu area (Benadir region), the most politically sensitive area in which to form local government, efforts have already begun to establish councils in the 15 districts. The district council of Bondhere in North Mogadishu was certified on 6 December 1993. Since then, consultations have been undertaken in the Wadajir and Dharkenley districts in South Mogadishu; Karan, Yaqshid and Shibis in North Mogadishu; and Waeberi and Hamar Jab-jab in Central Mogadishu. UNOSOM II will proceed with its efforts in this area with cautious deliberation in view of the prevailing circumstances.

12. In addition to establishing additional district councils, efforts are continuing with a view to strengthening those councils already established. An inter-divisional team of UNOSOM II staff has been paying visits to each district to assess the particular support needed by local governments. Assistance from various donor countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been essential in the provision of starter kits - basic office supplies and furniture - for the district councils. While most of these councils face predictable problems in their initial phase of operation, they represent an important step towards re-establishing viable and representative government in Somalia.

3. Regional councils

13. Since my last report, two additional regional councils have also been formed, bringing the total number of regional councils to 8 out of the 13 in Somalia, excluding the north-west. Three more regional councils, in Bari,

Lower Juba and Mudug, are expected to be inaugurated soon. Only in the Middle Juba is the process facing obstacles, owing to a deteriorating security situation in two of the three districts there. Efforts are being made to stabilize the situation in that region with the aim of establishing councils in the two districts in question. In accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the regional councils shall be entrusted primarily with the task of implementing humanitarian, social and economic programmes in coordination with the Transitional National Council (TNC) and will also assist in the conduct of the internationally supervised census. In addition to maintaining liaison with UNOSOM II, United Nations specialized agencies, NGOs and other relevant organizations directly and through the central administrative departments and the TNC, the regional councils shall also be responsible for law and order at the regional level.

4. Transitional National Council

14. With the exception of the United Somali Congress (USC)/SNA faction, participants in the recent Addis Ababa political meetings expressed a strong intention to work towards the rapid establishment of the TNC. It is my hope to see the TNC established shortly, in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993. There is broad commitment among most sections of the Somali political spectrum for this crucial step towards the re-establishment of Somali sovereignty. Nevertheless, again reflecting the basic disagreements among the Somali factions regarding the status of the district and regional councils, strong objections were raised by SNA to the effort to establish the TNC.

15. At present UNOSOM II has received nine nominations for representatives from the 15 political factions, each of which may nominate one representative to the TNC. In addition, regional councils, which nominate three representatives each, have begun deliberations for the selection of their representatives to the TNC.

16. According to the March 1993 Addis Ababa agreement, progress towards the establishment of the TNC is a critical step in accelerating the assumption by Somalis of responsibility for political and economic processes. Once formed, the TNC can begin to address the many governmental and legal issues involved in the rehabilitation of Somali governance which go beyond UNOSOM II's mandate.

5. Police and justice

17. Progress has been made in the re-establishment of police forces and justice systems in Somalia, both of which are critical for the return of functional Somali governance and public order. This is particularly important in the north-east, where at present no United Nations military forces have been deployed. Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 814 (1993), 865 (1993) and 886 (1993), Unified Task Force (UNITAF)/UNOSOM II has now re-established 107 police stations in Somalia's districts, with one district court, one regional court and one appeal court functioning in Mogadishu, and 15 district courts, 5 regional courts and 5 courts of appeal re-established in the north-west. Both Mogadishu Central Prison and Hargeisa Prison are already functioning. Nationally, there are now 6,737 policemen at the regional and district levels,

311 judicial personnel in 8 regions and 26 districts, and over 700 prison officers in two regions.

18. The police, judicial and penal systems are still very fragile. It is imperative to consolidate and enhance these systems in order to secure law and order. With the mandate to accelerate the process of assumption by Somalis of the operations of the police and judicial systems, UNOSOM II plans to involve Somali police, prison, judicial and social service personnel in advisory capacities during this phase of the justice programme.

19. In order to enhance security, the Mogadishu police stations have been supplied with radio links among themselves and with the UNOSOM II forces Provost Marshal's Office. This will facilitate coordination between the Somali police and UNOSOM military. It is also planned to put in place a Somali police rapid deployment force known as Darawishta by March 1994. These improvements will allow reduction of the involvement of UNOSOM II military forces in the role of policing.

B. Humanitarian situation

20. Since my last report, UNOSOM II has renewed its effort to place humanitarian programmes at the forefront of its work in Somalia. This initiative was highlighted at the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993. Somali delegates and international donors reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate Somali control of the recovery and development process.

1. The continuing emergency

21. Though the fight to end famine in Somalia has been successful, several indicators suggest that in the past few months malnutrition levels are again on the rise in parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu and the Juba valley, two areas of ongoing conflict and insecurity. In the lower Juba valley, levels of acute malnutrition among children under five has doubled to 20 per cent. Targeting these vulnerable populations in spite of challenging security problems remains a top commitment of UNOSOM's humanitarian division and the NGOs, United Nations agencies and military forces with which it collaborates. Collectively these organizations have stepped up efforts in the past two months to provide emergency food relief and medical treatment wherever it is needed; notably, assistance has been provided to flood victims in the north-east of Somalia, to Ethiopian refugees in Mogadishu, to the disabled, orphans and schoolchildren and to returning refugees in the Juba valley.

2. Resettlement

22. UNOSOM II has continued to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other agencies to facilitate the safe and orderly return of Somali refugees and internally displaced persons. Successful resettlement projects have been particularly in evidence in the Juba

valley, where since October over 3,000 persons have returned from camps in Kenya, Kismayo and Mogadishu. Careful monitoring and follow-up by cooperating agencies have ensured that these movements have occurred without significant setbacks. Insecurity in parts of Somalia has slowed and complicated resettlement programmes. None the less, assisting Somali families to return to their homes remains a top priority.

3. The Addis Ababa Declaration

23. In a significant step towards handing over to the Somalis the responsibility for the recovery of their country, representatives from Somali regions, political movements and the international donor community agreed at Addis Ababa on a regionally based strategy for the establishment of mechanisms for resource mobilization and allocation and the development of programmes and projects. The regional focus is an important step towards directing international development resources to those communities which have succeeded in creating and maintaining a secure environment in which development efforts can take place.

24. The strategy now being followed by the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II rests on the following six principal approaches agreed upon at the meeting in Addis Ababa:

(a) Essential emergency assistance is unconditional and will continue to be provided to vulnerable groups;

(b) Rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance will only be provided where stability and security exist;

(c) Involvement of Somalis in all stages of rehabilitation and reconstruction is essential. Somali control of the process is a prerequisite to donor assistance;

(d) Every effort must be made to ensure that rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts are sustainable;

(e) All actions in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process should contribute to the enhancement of efficient operations of the private sector in a free and open market system;

(f) The donor community will be fully supportive of the mechanisms being set up to determine rehabilitation priorities, funding modalities and implementation.

25. Broad agreements were reached at the Addis Ababa meeting regarding mechanisms which would facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the Declaration. Development committees will be established in the various regions and will be responsible for giving priority to regional development activities and for mobilizing resources from communities in support of those activities. A Development Council, composed of representatives of the regional development committees, will be formed to develop a mechanism for mobilizing resources and

providing criteria for the allocation of those resources across regions and sectors. An Aid Coordination Body is to be set up to coordinate donor assistance to Somalia. It is envisaged that this body will comprise representatives of donors, United Nations agencies and programmes, NGOs, other multilateral and African institutions and organizations and possibly countries in the region. The United Nations Office of Development, under the umbrella of the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM, will provide technical support for the regional development committees and serve as a secretariat for the Development Council and for the Aid Coordinating Body. The Office will embrace the skills and experience of Somali professionals, United Nations agencies and NGOs.

26. As agreed at the Addis Ababa meeting, a plan of action to guide the implementation of the provisions of the Addis Ababa Declaration is currently being finalized. It is intended to initiate implementing the regionally based strategy in those regions where a large measure of stability and security prevails. Combined United Nations/NGO/donor missions will be launched to each of these regions.

4. The impact of insecurity

27. Humanitarian programmes continue to face challenging security problems in Somalia. Insecurity in parts of the country, coupled with slow progress in political rehabilitation and reconciliation, has adversely affected humanitarian work. Under these circumstances, donors are reluctant to commit funding; NGOs sometimes suspend or withdraw operations for reasons of staff safety; agencies have difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified international staff; and costs of relief and development operations soar, owing in part to additional security requirements. Collectively these by-products of the political impasse have hampered UNOSOM II's efforts to move forward with humanitarian initiatives.

C. Security issues

28. Since my last report in mid-November (S/26738), the security situation in many parts of Somalia has given rise to concern. Outside Mogadishu, endemic banditry continues to plague parts of the countryside. Outbreaks of localized inter-clan fighting have occurred, most notably in the contested portions of Lower Shabelle and the Lower and Middle Juba regions. A number of recent security incidents involving threats and actual attacks against international agencies in outlying regions has led to the temporary cessation of operations of a number of NGOs in the Lower Juba region and all of the NGOs in the Saakow district (Middle Juba region). Despite these incidents, however, the countryside continues to enjoy a level of security far superior to that of 18 months ago.

29. The Mogadishu area, in particular, remains tense. While direct armed confrontation between the SNA and UNOSOM II forces has been avoided, armed banditry on the streets of Mogadishu has grown considerably, making movement for Somali commercial traffic, UNOSOM personnel and international humanitarian relief supplies increasingly dangerous. In a number of separate incidents, casualties have been suffered by UNOSOM civilian and NGO staff, both

international and local, on the streets of Mogadishu. Armed robbery directed at UNOSOM II or NGO vehicles and property is on the rise as well and often causes casualties. As a result, there has been a significant reduction in the presence of international NGOs willing to work in the current environment in Mogadishu.

30. Security for international staff remains a troublesome issue. UNOSOM remains at phase IV of the Security Evacuation Plan. Travel for all staff in and around Mogadishu is under armed escort only, with many areas of the city being out of bounds. The previous practice of hiring private cars until UNOSOM II received its United Nations-type vehicles has created a difficult problem owing to the frequent threats if an attempt is made to replace a civilian hired car with a United Nations vehicle. Hijacking of United Nations vehicles continues. A concerted effort is being made to provide sufficient hard-cover offices and sleeping areas in both South and North Mogadishu to reduce the risk of injury if there should be a resumption of hostilities. The long hours of work, the restricted travel, the substandard accommodation in many sites throughout Somalia, the inexperience of some staff and the constant security threat make it increasingly difficult to retain staff beyond a six-month initial assignment. Thus, there is a constant need to train new staff and at any one time there are a limited number of staff with institutional memory.

1. Disarmament and demobilization

31. It has been clear from the outset that general disarmament, beginning with the heavy weapons, is a necessary precondition for the establishment of the peaceful and secure environment which is required in order to facilitate national reconciliation, rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. During the meeting held at Addis Ababa in January 1993, all the Somali parties had agreed that disarmament was essential to the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. This fundamental objective was clearly reaffirmed in the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 by which the parties, inter alia, invited UNOSOM II to assist in the disarmament process and take appropriate action against those who might violate these provisions of the agreement.

32. Unfortunately, the commitments made at Addis Ababa have not been honoured by the Somali parties. In accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, and after deliberate attacks against it by one of the Somali parties, UNOSOM II tried to bring about disarmament through coercive means. However, as the members of the Security Council are aware, this course of action has proved to be impracticable.

33. Following the adoption of resolution 865 (1993), UNOSOM has sought to convince the Somali parties to undertake the disarmament process on a voluntary basis. It has developed plans to provide vocational training for young militiamen following their demobilization and is preparing the establishment of training centres in Mogadishu and in the Baidoa area to train demobilized personnel in skills that will help them reintegrate into society. It is intended that these centres will be operated and managed by the Somalis themselves, albeit with the initial involvement of UNOSOM II and the assistance of the relevant United Nations agencies.

34. Clearly, however, voluntary disarmament can only be successful if the Somali parties display the necessary courage and determination to put their recent past behind them and resolutely embark upon the difficult but challenging process of political reconciliation, institution-building and economic rehabilitation. Unfortunately, there are growing indications that the major factions are actively rearming in anticipation of renewed hostilities in the coming months. In Mogadishu, reports indicate that certain clans are replenishing their weapons supplies. It is also reported that clans are erecting defensive positions within the areas they consider as key strategic strongholds in the city. There also appears to be a build-up of troops in the Kismayo region south of Mogadishu.

35. The unwillingness of the parties to engage in a meaningful process of disarmament, at least at this time, regrettably shows that the present insecurity in Mogadishu and, to a lesser degree, in other parts of Somalia will continue to be a serious concern in the months ahead. I therefore wish to appeal to the parties to recommit themselves to the disarmament process agreed upon during the January and March 1993 meetings at Addis Ababa and to work constructively with UNOSOM II in order to determine the modalities for the concrete implementation of these commitments.

2. De-mining

36. De-mining operations, urgently needed in parts of Somalia, require a degree of political stability and security that has frequently been absent precisely in those regions most in need of such operations. In the north-west, de-mining projects conducted by a professional international mine-clearing firm have continued in spite of a shortage of donor funding. Elsewhere in Somalia, insecurity has precluded the option of bringing in professional assistance from abroad to manage mine clearance. UNOSOM II is now exploring the possibility of facilitating local "self-help" mine-clearing endeavours where security permits and where Somali communities seek assistance.

3. Deployment

37. In a previous report (S/26317), I had indicated that an additional brigade would be required to enable UNOSOM II to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council. This would have brought the authorized troops strength of UNOSOM II to over 32,000 all ranks. However, over the past few months, a number of Governments, including Belgium, France and Sweden, have informed me of their intention to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II by the end of December 1993. Moreover, on 6 October the United States of America announced that it would withdraw its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Accordingly, the French contingent (1,100 all ranks), the Belgian contingent (950 all ranks) and the Swedish Field Hospital (150 all ranks) were withdrawn from Somalia in December 1993. In addition, the United States withdrew 1,400 military logistics personnel at the end of December. As a result, the strength of UNOSOM II on 1 January 1994 was 25,945.

38. Four other Member States have given advance notice to the United Nations of the withdrawal of their contingents before the end of March 1994: Italy (2,300), Germany (1,350), Turkey (320) and Norway (140). The United States also will withdraw the rest of its military logistics personnel (1,400) by the end of March 1994.

39. The total of the withdrawals in paragraphs 37 and 38 above amounts to 9,110. This figure does not include the United States Quick Reaction Force (1,350), which will also be withdrawn at that time.

40. On the above basis, the troop strength available at the end of March 1994 will be 19,700. Two Member States have indicated their intention to deploy a total of 2,300 additional military personnel. However, the actual date of deployment is not known at this time.

D. Administrative questions

41. Administratively, UNOSOM II continues to face challenges related to the difficult working and security environment in South Mogadishu. The international staff of 199 currently assigned to the UNOSOM II Administration Division is insufficient to perform all the tasks assigned, and in particular, to ensure adequate control and management of financial accounts, supervision and registration of United Nations inventory, control of procurement activity and provision of timely management information.

42. While UNOSOM II makes every effort to pursue local purchases whenever feasible, virtually no material of suitable quantity or quality is available locally. Nearly all logistic support other than some service contracts must be purchased internationally. This fact, combined with the size of Somalia and the poor roads, necessitates an enormous airlift capability. Air rental and aviation fuel alone cost approximately US$ 6.3 million per month.

43. The withdrawal of United States forces and the transfer of logistic support for all of UNOSOM II made it necessary to continue arrangements with an American contractor, which had initially been selected by the United States Government. Requests over the last two months to 42 Governments for logistical units have brought no positive response. The contract with the United States contractor was presented to, and recommended by, the Headquarters Committee on Contracts in accordance with the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules. The contract is for a cost of approximately US$ 32 million for a period of four months until the end of March 1994, during which period alternatives will be explored. By 28 December 1993, the contractor was in a position to provide supply support, produce and deliver water, provide short and long road transport for passengers and cargo and maintain facilities, roads and utilities.

II. OBSERVATIONS

44. The preceding sections of the present report describe the results achieved by UNOSOM II in fulfilling its mandate in the three interrelated fields, viz., political, humanitarian and security. While progress has been achieved, the

mandate of UNOSOM II is far from being fully accomplished. I would consider UNOSOM II's mandate as being completed only when the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 is fully implemented, culminating in the holding of general elections and the installation of a popularly elected Government. This is predicated on the fulfilment of two indispensable conditions: a spirit of cooperation, compromise and commitment on the part of the Somali people and the continued involvement of the international community.

45. As far as the international community is concerned, it has given ample evidence of its concern for the suffering people of Somalia. Nations around the world have sent their men and women to serve in Somalia with UNOSOM I, UNITAF or UNOSOM II or with one of the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Many lives have been lost, both military and civilian, in the search for peace and stability in Somalia. States Members of the United Nations have invested huge sums of money in an operation which has literally saved hundreds of thousands of lives, especially among the most vulnerable sections of Somali society. This sacrifice is indeed remarkable, particularly when put in the perspective of the international community having to make available immense resources, human and material, for many other United Nations operations in different parts of the world, and keeping in mind the severe economic difficulties which many countries, developing and developed, have been experiencing for the past few years.

46. However, there are unmistakable signs of fatigue among the international community as it continues to be called upon to extend such assistance through the United Nations. This is reflected in the increasing delays in obtaining personnel from Member States and even longer delays in obtaining their financial contributions.

47. At the same time, I am convinced that the international community does not wish to shirk its responsibility towards the Somali people. At the Fourth Humanitarian Conference held at Addis Ababa in November/December last year, representatives of the donor community reiterated their willingness to help Somalia in its national rehabilitation and reconstruction. But they made it clear that their offer to commit further resources was conditional on the Somalis doing their part in bringing about national reconciliation and establishing at least minimum levels of security. The response of the international community would be proportionate to the determination, maturity and wisdom displayed by the Somali people and their leaders in resolving their differences, through dialogue rather than through resort to the use of arms, and to their cooperation with the collective efforts of the international community to help them. This would certainly be true for assistance in reconstruction and development. However, as far as providing troops and finances for UNOSOM II is concerned, the fatigue I referred to above seems unlikely to dissipate altogether or soon.

48. The agreement signed in Addis Ababa in March 1993 offers the only agreed framework within which a solution to Somalia's manifold problems would have to be found. That agreement was signed by the leaders of the 15 political parties, which now seem to be divided into two groups competing for political influence and domination. The March 1993 agreement remains valid and can only be modified with the consent of all the 15 factions. UNOSOM II cannot and will not stand in

the way should the parties to the Addis Ababa agreement voluntarily decide to modify its terms. However, until that happens, it is incumbent on all the factions to adhere to it.

49. UNOSOM II is on the side of the Somali people. Its only endeavour is to help the people of Somalia so that they can once again be the effective masters of their destiny. UNOSOM II does not and will not take sides among various factions. UNOSOM II, of course, welcomes the cooperation which it has received over the past several months from the Group of 12. UNOSOM II looks forward to receiving similar cooperation from USC/SNA. The Group of 12 insists on UNOSOM staying on in Somalia and persevering with its mandate. This is also the view of the regional States as well as of the Organization of African Unity. It is only SNA which has a negative, even hostile, attitude towards UNOSOM II. My position is clear: the international community must not abandon the people of Somalia as long as an overwhelming majority of them desire the presence of the United Nations.

50. The main focus of UNOSOM II's activities in the period ahead will be on promoting Somali initiatives in the political, security and nation-building process. That process must be a Somali process and every effort is and will continue to be made to help the Somalis assume responsibility for it. After the traumatic experiences they have gone through over the past two years, it would not be reasonable to expect the Somali people to undertake such a heavy responsibility in a short period of time. They will have to be given the necessary encouragement and support for some more time.

51. This additional period would be utilized by UNOSOM II to create a sustainable momentum in the task of political reconciliation, establishment of a Somali police and justice system and laying the foundation for an effective system of civil, financial and economic adminstration at the local, regional and central levels.

52. It is my considered assessment that without the continued stabilizing presence of an adequate United Nations force, there would be an early resumption of civil strife and an unravelling of all that has been achieved at the cost of so much sacrifice, human and material. What can be achieved will therefore depend on the willingness of Member States to see the Somalia operation to its successful conclusion, so that the people of Somalia can look forward to a reasonably promising future after so many years of suffering and strife.

53. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether the required level of resources will be available after 31 March 1994. As has been pointed out above, the military strength of UNOSOM II will be down to 19,700 by the end of March this year. It should be kept in mind that UNOSOM II will be deprived of the specialized capabilities which had been available to several of the withdrawing contingents, as well as of the United States Quick Reaction Force, which will also have withdrawn at that time. I have approached a large number of Member States with a view to obtaining their contributions to UNOSOM II's military component. The United States has also made efforts in this regard. However, as of the date of the present report, not a single positive response has been received. While the possibility of some offers of new or additional troops should not be ruled out, it would be prudent at this stage to assume that the

force level at the disposal of UNOSOM II after 31 March 1994 will not be much more than 19,700, and could even be less.

54. The question of the availability of timely and adequate financing for UNOSOM II operations is another important factor which must be taken into account. The United Nations has already spent US$ 765 million for UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II so far. The cost of UNOSOM II operations for the period from 1 November 1993 to 31 March 1994 is estimated at US$ 413.5 million. 2/ As of 31 December 1993, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOSOM Special Account amounted to US$ 100 million. The non-payment or late payment of assessed contributions makes it impossible for Member States to be reimbursed for their contribution to UNOSOM II. This, in turn, adversely affects the willingness of Member States either to maintain their contributions or to increase them or send new contingents, not only for a particular operation but to United Nations peace-keeping operations in general.

55. In my report of 12 November 1993 (S/26738), I outlined three options relating to the mandate and functioning of UNOSOM II as regards security. Whatever option is selected, the United Nations will continue its efforts to promote national reconciliation and institution-building.

- The first option is a continuation of UNOSOM II's current mandate, with the addition of an extra brigade. It would call for disarmament, coercive if necessary, as well as a capability for defence against attacks against UNOSOM II personnel;

- The second option calls for voluntary disarmament and the deployment of about 16,000 troops to protect ports, convoys and refugees;

- The third option calls for the deployment of only 5,000 troops, which would keep control over Mogadishu port and airport as well as other important ports and airports.

56. My preference would be for the first option, since I am convinced that only a comprehensive mandate, as laid down by the Security Council in its various resolutions, would make it possible for UNOSOM II to create a secure environment and to accelerate its efforts to help the Somali people as they move along the process of national reconciliation and institution-building. However, for all the reasons that I have explained above, the first option will have to be excluded. Indeed, I am not even confident that UNOSOM II will have adequate human, material and financial resources or that the Somali leaders will have advanced enough on the road of national reconciliation to be able to undertake all the activities envisaged even under the second option as described in my previous report. This is mainly a result of the continued negative attitude of SNA towards UNOSOM II, reports of an arms build-up by all the factions in Somalia and the revival of inter-clan fighting and increased banditry.

57. I would therefore recommend the second option for the consideration of the Security Council. Under that option, UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties. In the event that inter-clan fighting resumes in different parts of the country, UNOSOM II, while not becoming involved in it, will retain some capability to defend its personnel

if circumstances so warrant. UNOSOM II would protect the important ports and airports in the country as well as the essential infrastructure of Somalia; keep open the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outside areas; pursue as a matter of utmost priority the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial systems; and help with the repatriation of refugees. As far as the humanitarian aspects are concerned, UNOSOM II will continue its efforts to provide emergency relief supplies to all in need throughout the country. With respect to rehabilitation and development, UNOSOM II will coordinate its activities in such a manner that programmes of assistance of the international community are supported in areas of their choice. As members of the Security Council are aware, the donor community made it very clear at the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa that aid would go only to those regions where security prevailed and where counterpart Somali institutions were available. As far as the political processes in Somalia are concerned, UNOSOM II will continue to play a role as desired by the Somali people.

58. The number of troops required under this option would be of the order of 16,000 all ranks and the necessary support element. If this order of troop strength is not available or if the necessary financial resources are not available after 31 March 1994, I will bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council with, possibly, a modified recommendation regarding the mandate of UNOSOM II.

59. I should like to sound a note of caution and concern. As I have stated in paragraph 56 above, my preference continues to be for the first option. The success of UNOSOM II under the modified second option, as enunciated in paragraph 57 above, will depend, more than ever before, on the cooperation of the Somali parties. It is difficult to predict the course of action which different Somali factions might embark upon during the period following 31 March 1994. This would largely depend on their perception of UNOSOM II's capability to discharge its functions effectively. It is indispensable for all concerned to promote national reconciliation in parallel with the re-establishment and strengthening of the Somali institutions of police and justice. Should these efforts fail, we might witness renewed fighting and civil war in Somalia.

60. There is another, positive contingency that we should take into consideration. If the Somalis succeed in establishing the TNC in the near future, that would be a significant development. The international community would watch with interest the functioning of the TNC. In case the TNC is able to function reasonably effectively through the Somali institutions of local self-government, it might have a bearing on the mandate of UNOSOM II. I shall naturally bring any such development to the attention of the Security Council.

61. As I conclude this report, I wish to reiterate my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe, to my Deputy Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, to the Commander of the United Nations Force, General Cevik Bir, and to the UNOSOM II soldiers of all ranks who have served the United Nations, with courage and devotion, in extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances. I also wish to convey my sincere gratitude to the men and women of the United Nations Secretariat who have served the cause of peace and humanitarian assistance in Somalia in some of the most

dangerous conditions ever confronted by United Nations civilian personnel. I further wish to pay tribute to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the NGOs and to the participating agencies and programmes of the United Nations system, as well as to Governments which have extended direct assistance to the Somali people, thus supplementing the efforts of UNOSOM II. Above all, I pay tribute to the international and Somali personnel of UNOSOM II who made the supreme sacrifice in seeking to bring the help of the international community and the United Nations to the people of Somalia.

Notes

1/ The legal status of several districts is still the subject of discussions between UNOSOM II and local Somali communities. As a result, the total number of districts said to exist in Somalia may vary.

2/ A/48/777, para. 7.